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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Case No. 920126-CA
Priority No. 2

RENE RUIZ,
Defendant/Appellant.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Utah Code Ann. section 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1992 Repl. Vol.)
provides this Court's jurisdiction over this non-capital, non-first
degree felony criminal conviction from the district court.

STATEMENT OF ISSUE
Did the search warrant affidavit provide probable cause for
the no-knock nighttime search warrant?

STANDARD OF REVIEW
In assessing this issue, this Court should read the
affidavit "in a common sense manner and as a whole," State v. Rowe,
806 P.2d 730, 732 (Utah App.)(citation omitted), cert, granted, 167
Utah Adv. Rep. 26 (Utah 1991), and determine whether the affidavit
establishes probable cause for the no-knock nighttime warrant.
Constitution of Utah, Article I section 14. The standard of review
of the search warrant affidavit is discussed further in Point I of
this brief.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Appendix 1 to this brief contains the full text of the
following controlling constitutional and statutory provisions:
United States Constitution, Amendment IV
Utah Constitution, Article I section 14
Utah Code Ann. section 77-1-3(4) (1991 Cum. Supp.)
Utah Code Ann. section 77-23-4(1) (1990 Repl. Vol.)
Utah Code Ann. section 77-23-5(1) (1990 Repl. Vol.)
Utah Code Ann. section 77-23-10(2) (1990 Repl. Vol.).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The State originally charged Mr. Ruiz with one count of
unlawful possession of a controlled substance with the intent to
distribute and one count of unlawful possession of a controlled
substance (R. 6-7).
Defense counsel moved to suppress evidence seized in
violation of Article I section 14 of the Utah Constitution and the
fourth amendment to the United States Constitution (R. 25-26).

The

prosecutor filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion to
suppress (R. 49-51).

The parties relied on State v. Rowe, 806 P.2d

730 (Utah App.), cert, granted/ 167 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 (Utah 1991).
After hearing argument concerning the sufficiency of the affidavit
to support the issuance of the no-knock nighttime search warrant,,
the trial court denied the motion to suppress (R. 60, T.6/14/91
18-21).

The trial court ordered the prosecutor to prepare the

findings and conclusions (T.6/14/91 21), and the prosecutor did so
(R. 76-80).

Defense counsel filed an objection to the findings

(R. 74-75), and the prosecutor filed a motion for the trial court to
sign the proposed findings or set a hearing (R. 83-84).
-2 -

The trial

court did not sign the proposed findings or set the matter for
hearing.1
Mr. Ruiz subsequently entered a conditional guilty plea to
one count of unlawful possession of a controlled substance, a third
degree felony (R. 61, 63-69; T.6/17/91 3-14).

The trial court

sentenced Mr. Ruiz to a term of one to five years in the Utah State
Prison and fined him $1,000 (with a 25% surcharge) (R. 93-94).

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The magistrate issued a no-knock nighttime search warrant
directing the searching officers to confiscate the following items
from Rene Montoya and the apartment located at 1975 South 1100 East,
#8 (R. 52-53):
Cocaine, a white substance in powder or solid
form. Drug paraphernalia, specifically smoking
devices, scales, cutting agents and packaging
materials. Records pertaining to narcotics
transactions. U.S. Currency, and all items which
are determined to be collateral or proceeds from
narcotics transactions.
(R. 52).
The magistrate issued the warrant on the basis of
information included in the affidavit for the search warrant
submitted by Officer Craig Watson (R. 54-56) and apparently did not
make a record of any clarification or supplementation of the
affidavit.

1. Because the issue before this Court allows this Court
to simply review the search warrant affidavit, State v. Weaver, 169
Utah Adv. Rep. 47, 48 (Utah App. 1991), this Court needs no
clarification of the trial court's ruling in this case.
-3 -

The magistrate signed the search warrant on June 5, 1990,
before Rowe was published.
Copies of the search warrant, affidavit for the search
warrant, and return are in Appendix 2 to this brief.
The following quotation of the search warrant affidavit
distinguishes between the portions of the affidavit which apparently
were preprinted from the portions which apparently were typed in, by
underlining the apparently preprinted portions.

The references to

Rene Montoya are underlined in the original affidavit.

The portion

of the affidavit that was written by hand is in bold-face type in
the following quotation.

The paragraphs are numbered in the

quotation for future reference.

The search warrant affidavit

states, in part, as follows:
The facts to establish the grounds for issuance
of a Search Warrant are:
1.

Your affiant is a Deputy Sheriff for the Salt
Lake County Sheriff's Office with over two years
experience. Your affiant has been assigned to
the Narcotics Division for one year, and has
worked as an Undercover Investigator for eight
months. During which time, your affiant made
over 170 undercover drug buys. Your affiant has
been trained by the Utah Peace Officer's
Standards and Training, the Salt Lake County
Sheriff's Training Division, and numerous hours
of on the job training. Your affiant has also
received 24 hours training from the Clandestine
Law Investigators Association (C.L.I.A.), and 24
hours from the California Narcotics Officers
Association, (C.N.O.A).

2.

Your affiant, in the past seven days, has
initiated the purchase of controlled substance
from inside the address to be searched,
specifically cocaine. This was done by utilizing
a confidential informant, (hereafter referred to
as a C.I.). The circumstances surrounding the
purchase are described as follows:
-4 -

The C.I. was searched prior to, and immediately
after the purchase. This was done to ensure no
other controlled substance, or money, were
present. The C.I. was given a predetermined
amount of money. The C.I. was kept under
constant visual observation from the time of the
first search, until the second, with the
exception of the time the C.I. was directly
inside the residence to be searched. At the time
of the second search, the C.I. produced a
substance, which field tested positive for
cocaine.
Prior to the above described purchase, your
affiant received information from a second C.I.,
that a Hispanic, Male, named RENE, was dealing in
large quantities of cocaine, and he lived in an
apartment located at approximately 2000 South.
This C.I. did have the phone number for RENE, and
gave it to the Sheriff's Office. The number is
485-6125. This number was checked with telephone
security, and the subscriber was listed as Rene
MONTOYA, at 1975 South 1100 East, #18.
Your affiant has also been advised by Detective
Keith Stephens, of the Sheriff's Office Narcotics
division, of a third C.I. he had received
information from, about a Hispanic, Male, named:
RENE, who was dealing cocaine at 1975 South 1100
East. This C.I. gave a description of a vehicle,
which Rene MONTOYA had been driving. A vehicle
matching the description has been observed parked
at the address to be searched by your affiant.
This C.I. also advised Detective Stephens of the
intense counter surveillance done by MONTOYA, and
those who help, and/or work for him. This
counter surveillance has been observed by your
affiant.
YOUR AFFIANT HAS OBSERVED PERSONS WALKING BACK
AND FORTH IN FRONT OF THE APARTMENT, WRITING DOWN
LICENSE PLATE #S, WATCHING FOR PERSONS BEING
FOLLOWED. AND OR JUST BEING A LOOKOUT.
Your affiant considers the information received
from the confidential informant reliable because
(if any information is obtained from an unnamed
source) All information received from the C.I.
has proven to be true and accurate. The C.I. has
always followed instructions exactly as they were
given. Your affiant has received information

from three independent confidential sources,
where-in the information is corroborating.
9.

Your affiant has verified the above information
from the confidential informant to be correct and
accurate through the following independent
investigation: Sheriff's Office records checks
have verified information received from all
C.I.'s. All substances purchased by the C.I.
tested positive for cocaine.

(R. 55-56).
The portion of the affidavit seeking nighttime
authorization states,
10.

WHEREFORE, the affiant prays that a Search
Warrant be issued for the seizure of said items;
( ) in the day time.
(XX) at any time day or night because there is
reason to believe it is necessary to seize the
property prior to it being concealed, destroyed,
damaged, or altered or for other good reasons, to
vit;
All narcotics related activity at the address to
be searched was observed in the evening hours.

(R. 56). The portion of the affidavit seeking no-knock
authorization states,
11.

It is further requested that fif appropriate) the
officer executing the requested warrant not be
required to give notice of the officer/s
authority or purpose because:
(XX) physical harm may result to any person if
notice were given? or
(XX) the property sought may be quickly
destroyed, disposed of, or secreted.
This danger is believed to exist because;
Handguns have been found on most narcotic search
warrants.
Montoya has made statements to two C.I.'s, which
indicate he has, and will, use a hand-gun to
defend his narcotics.
Counter surveillance has been observed at 1975
South 1100 East.

(R. 56).

-6 -

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court should hold under Article I section 14 of the
Utah Constitution that no deference is afforded to the magistrate on
review of the issuance of a no-knock nighttime search warrant.

The

deference afforded to magistrates issuing search warrants under
federal law should not be extended to the context of no-knock
nighttime search warrants and is illogical under the Utah statutory
scheme.
When reading the affidavit in this case "in a common sense
manner and as a whole," Rowe, supra, this Court can see that the
affidavit fails to establish probable cause for the issuance of the
no-knock nighttime search warrant.

Facial discrepancies in the

affidavit that were never clarified by the magistrate preclude a
finding of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant.

The

affidavit does not state adequate facts to allow a neutral and
detached assessment by a magistrate.

The affidavit fails to

establish the statutory predicates for the issuance of a no-knock
nighttime search warrant.
Because the "barebones" affidavit was patently inadequate
to justify the issuance of the no-knock nighttime search warrant,
the officer's search cannot be justified under the federal "good
faith" exception to the exclusionary rule, which does not apply
under the Utah Constitution.
The evidence seized pursuant to the no-knock nighttime
search warrant should be suppressed.

-7 -

ARGUMENT
I.
THIS COURT SHOULD
READ THE AFFIDAVIT AND DETERMINE IF
THE AFFIDAVIT PROVIDES PROBABLE CAUSE
FOR THE ISSUANCE OF THE NO-KNOCK NIGHTTIME WARRANT.
Under the fourth amendment, the United States Supreme Court
has indicated that reviewing courts are to grant a magistrate's
issuance of a search warrant great deference and review for a
"substantial basis" for the issuance of the warrant, rather than for
probable cause, theorizing that if reviewing courts scrutinize
warrant affidavits too closely, that will somehow discourage police
from seeking warrants prior to conducting searches.

See Illinois v.

Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983).
The first problem with the deference afforded to the
magistrates by the United States Supreme Court is the vagueness of
the "substantial basis" test.

Search warrants should only issue if

the search warrant affidavits establish probable cause, by asserting
facts that would lead a reasonable person to believe that there is
"a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be
found in a particular place."
(1983).

Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238

Yet under the United States Supreme Court's standards,

reviewing courts are to read the affidavits for a "substantial
basis" for the issuance of the search warrants and are expressly not
to review for probable cause.
test is abstruse.
or it does not."

Id. at 236.

The "substantial basis"

"Either an affidavit establishes probable cause
State v. Weaver. 169 Utah Adv. Rep. 47, 50 (Utah

App. 1991)(Orme, J., concurring).

-8 -

The second problem with the deference afforded to the
magistrates by the United States Supreme Court is that this
deference undercuts the critical role of meaningful judicial review
in enforcing citizens' rights to privacy.

The historical importance

of meaningful judicial review of the issuance of warrants can be
appreciated through review of the appendix to State v. Rowe, 806
P.2d 730, 740-743 (Utah App. 1991).

Police officers preparing

search warrant affidavits and magistrates issuing warrants are most
likely to do the best job of upholding the constitutions if they are
stimulated to do so by meaningful judicial review.

Id. at 743.

Rather than requiring police and magistrates to follow the
constitutional requirements of securing search warrants based on
probable cause prior to searches, with the "substantial basis" test,
the United States Supreme Court tacitly informs police officers and
magistrates that if the officers and magistrates will at least file
the paperwork before the searches, the courts may be willing to look
the other way if the paperwork is substantively lacking in probable
cause.

See State v. Weaver, 169 Utah Adv. Rep. 47, 49 (Utah App.

1991)(Orme, J. concurring)("The stated reason [for deferring to the
magistrates' probable cause finding] ... is to encourage the use of
warrants.

...

It should be reason enough to rigidly require the

use of warrants that the Constitution requires them and further
requires that they be supported by probable cause.")(citations
omitted).
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The unique statutory scheme in Utah calls for evenhanded
and meaningful review of all search warrant affidavits.

In seeking

search warrants, police may approach any justice, judge, or justice
of the peace in this state.

Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-3(4) (1991 Cum.

Supp.)(allowing all judges and justices of any court to act as
magistrates).

As the Court reviewing many search warrant

affidavits, and as the Court composed of seven magistrates, this
Court is in a position to take judicial notice of the fact that Utah
magistrates do not uniformly have the opportunity to develop
expertise in issuing search warrants.

It appears that those

magistrates with the most experience in evaluating the affidavits
obtain that experience because the police most often solicit search
warrants from these select magistrates.

Judicial review is most

important in these circumstances, to insure the neutrality and
detachment of the magistrates.

Under the Utah statutory scheme, it

cannot be said that magistrates should be deferred to because they
develop expertise through repeated exposure to search warrant
affidavits.

See State v. Weaver, 169 Utah Adv. Rep. 47, 49-50 (Utah

App. 1991)(Orme, J. concurring)(noting hypothesis that deference to
magistrates might be justified by their expertise developed through
repeated experience with search warrant affidavits).
Under the Utah statutory scheme, magistrates are directed
to receive evidence in support of search warrants in written form or
to record the evidence verbatim and have the record transcribed.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-4(1) (1990 Repl.).

In these circumstances,

the magistrates should not be privy to information unavailable to

-10-

reviewing courts, and the scope of information available to the
magistrates does not provide a basis for deferring to the
magistrates.

See State v. Weaver. 169 Utah Adv. Rep. 47, 49-50

(Utah App. 1991)(Orme, J. concurring)(noting hypothesis that
deference to magistrates might be justified because magistrates have
the opportunity to clarify affidavits when they are presented, and
appellate courts may not be privy to the information available to
the magistrate, but stating, "On the other hand, such explanations
should be made of record even if only by appropriate interlineation
of the affidavit.").
Under the Utah statutory scheme, it cannot be said that
magistrates should be deferred to because they are at an
institutional disadvantage and lack the resources of reviewing
courts.

See State v. Weaver. 169 Utah Adv. Rep. 47, 49-50 (Utah

App. 1991)(Orme, J. concurring)(noting hypothesis that deference to
magistrates might be justified because magistrates operate at an
"institutional disadvantage," without the time and resources
available to appellate judges.).

As an initial matter, evaluation

of search warrant affidavits does not require great resources—it
simply requires a thoughtful reading of the affidavits.

As a

secondary matter, it seems curious that an appellate court would
exalt sympathy for the "institutionally disadvantaged" magistrates
over the fundamental constitutional rights at stake in search and
seizure cases.

Most importantly, in Utah, police have the

opportunity to forum shop.

Every justice, judge and justice of the

peace is authorized to act as magistrate.

The fact that the police

choose to patronize the magistrates with the least resources is
-11-

reason for meaningful appellate review and does not call for
deference to the magistrates.
It appears that none of the United States Supreme Court
cases directing reviewing courts to defer to the magistrates
involves no-knock nighttime search warrants.

This country has a

long history of reprobation of no-knock nighttime searches.

See

Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 498-500 (1958); Miller v.
United States, 357 U.S. 301, 306-08 (1958).

No-knock nighttime

search warrants pose extreme dangers to searching officers and
others inside or near the premises to be searched and involve an
extreme intrusion into the privacy and solitude of the home.

See

State v. Rowe, 806 P.2d 730, 734 n.5, 738-40, and nn.10 and 11,
(Utah App.)(main opinion and concurring opinion of
Garff, J.)(discussing the dangers posed by no-knock nighttime search
warrants), cert, granted, 167 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 (Utah 1991).

The

unique threats posed by no-knock nighttime search warrants call for
intense judicial review and counsel against deference to the
magistrates.

See State v. Rowe, 806 P.2d 730, 739-740 (Utah

App.)(Garff, J., concurring)("[W]henever a 'canned,' or preprinted
affidavit is presented to a magistrate, he or she has an affirmative
responsibility to scrutinize the factual circumstances justifying
the search warrant.

Conclusory or ambiguous statements in the

affidavit are insufficient.

This is particularly critical when the

warrant authorizes nighttime intrusion into a person's home.11),
cert, granted, 167 Utah Adv. Rep.
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26 (Utah 1991); State v. Buck. 756 P.2d 700, 703-04 (Utah
1988)(Zimmerman, J., concurring)(explaining the need for judicial
scrutiny of no-knock searches).
Numerous Utah cases have recognized that it is appropriate
for Utah courts to decide search and seizure cases on the basis of
independent Utah law.

See Allen v. Lindbeck, 93 P.2d 920 (Utah

1939)(decided under Article I section 14; striking statute
purporting to allow search warrant affidavits based on the belief of
the affiant, rather than stating the underlying facts).

See also

State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415 (Utah 1991); State v, LaRocco. 794
P.2d 460, 465-473 (Utah 1990)(plurality); State v, Nielsen. 727 P.2d
188, 192-93 (Utah 1986); State v. Hvah. 711 P.2d 264, 272 (Utah
1985)(Zimmerman, J., concurring).
Because federal deference to magistrates undercuts
important rights established by Article I section 14 of the Utah
Constitution and is illogical in the context of the Utah statutory
scheme, this Court should read affidavits in support of the no-knock
nighttime search warrants and determine if they state sufficient
facts to provide probable cause for the issuance of the warrants,
without any deference to the magistrates.
Article I section 14.

-13-

Constitution of Utah,

II.
THE AFFIDAVIT DOES NOT PROVIDE PROBABLE CAUSE
FOR THE ISSUANCE OF THE
NO-KNOCK NIGHTTIME SEARCH WARRANT.
A. SEARCH WARRANT AFFIDAVITS MUST PROVIDE SUFFICIENT FACTS FROM
WHICH A MAGISTRATE MAY MAKE AN INDEPENDENT FINDING OF PROBABLE CAUSE.
This Court set forth the federal law on how a magistrate is
to assess search warrant affidavits for probable cause, in State v.
Weaver, 169 Utah Adv. Rep. 47 (1991), explaining,
Probable cause is to be determined by the
totality of the circumstances. Illinois v.
Gates. 462 U.S. 213, 238-39, 103 S.Ct. 2317,
2332-33 (1983).
Under this analysis, the magistrate must
"make a practical, common-sense decision whether,
given all the circumstances set forth in the
affidavit before him, including the 'veracity'
and basis of knowledge of persons supplying
hearsay information, there is a fair probability
that contraband or evidence of a crime will be
found in a particular place.11 Gates, 462 U.S. at
238, 103 S.Ct. at 2332.
Id. at 47 (citations omitted).
It is important to note that the Utah Supreme Court has
recognized that the Gates "totality of the circumstances" test has
not wholly supplanted the Acruilar-Spinelli test in the evaluation of
affidavits based on information provided by informants.

For

instance, in State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099 (Utah 1985), the court
stated,
[I]n State v. Bailev. [675 P.2d 1203 (Utah
1984),] we observed that even under the Gates
"totality of the circumstances" standard,
compliance with the Aauilar-Spinelli guidelines
might be necessary to establish the requisite
"fair probability" that the evidence sought
actually exists and can be found where the
informant so states. However, in other cases, "a
less strong showing of the basis of the affiant's
knowledge, veracity and reliability may be
-14-

required, if the circumstances as a whole
indicate that the informant's report is
truthful.11 [Bailey, at 1205-06].
Id. at 1101-02 (footnotes omitted).

When the totality of

circumstances indicates the truthfulness of the informant's report,
the showing of the informant's basis of knowledge and veracity and
reliability may be "less strong," but there must still be some
showing of each of these three things.

Id.

Affidavits relying on police informants, rather than named
citizen informants, logically require heightened scrutiny.

In State

v. Treadway, 499 P.2d 846 (Utah 1972), the court explained, "Recent
case law has acknowledged that a different rationale exists for
establishing the reliability of named citizen informers as opposed
to unnamed police informers, who are frequently criminals.

Those in

the latter category often proffer information in exchange for some
concession, payment, or simply out of revenge against the subject?
under such circumstances, it is proper to demand some evidence of
their credibility or reliability."
deleted).

Id. at 848 (emphasis added and

The court indicated that the testimony of police

informers is viewed with "rigid scrutiny."

id.

Accord State v.

Brown, 798 P.2d 284, 286-287 and n.4 (Utah App. 1990)(police
informant testimony may require showing of "veracity, reliability,
and basis of knowledge" if circumstances do not "readily indicate
the truthfulness of the informant.").
Search warrant affidavits must provide sufficient factual
allegations for the magistrate to make an independent factual
assessment of probable cause.

Our state supreme court recognized

the importance of the exercise of independent factual assessment by
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magistrates in Allen v. Lindbeck. 93 P.2d 920 (Utah 1939).

Acting

under Article I section 14 of the Utah Constitution, the court
struck a statute authorizing the issuance of search warrants on the
basis of the affiant's belief of facts, stating,
"A warrant to search and seize, which follows
upon a statement based solely upon the belief of
the affiant, rests upon the reasoning of the
affiant, based upon the secret facts of which he
may have knowledge, and the conclusion which
results from such reasoning is affiant's, not
that of the judicial officer. The judicial
process to ascertain probable cause is then
transferred from the judicial officer to the
affiant. The Constitution permits no such thing."
Id. at 924-925 (citation omitted).
Numerous other cases decided under federal law have
recognized that, in the absence of sufficient factual bases in
search warrant affidavits, magistrates cannot act with the requisite
detachment and neutrality in issuing search warrants.

See

Giordanello v. United States. 357 U.S. 480, 486-87 (1958)(arrest
warrant); Aauilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 109, 111-14 (1964);
Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41, 47 (1933); Illinois v.
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 239 (1983).
Evidence seized under warrants obtained by magistrates'
"rubberstamping" of "barebones" affidavits must be suppressed; the
"good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule does not apply when
the police proceed on the basis of such affidavits and warrants.
State v. Droneburq. 781 P.2d 1303, 1304-05 (Utah App. 1989); State
v. Rowe. 806 P.2d 730, 738 (Utah App. 1991).
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B. SEARCH WARRANT AFFIDAVITS SEEKING NO-KNOCK NIGHTTIME SEARCH
WARRANTS MUST MEET SPECIFIC CRITERIA.
No-knock nighttime searches involve severe dangers to
searching officers and others inside or near the premises to be
searched, extreme intrusion into the privacy and solitude of the
home, and the destruction of property.

See State v* Rove. 806 P.2d

730, 734 n.5, 738-40, and nn.10 and 11, (Utah App.)(main opinion and
concurring opinion of Garff, J.)(discussing the dangers posed by
no-knock nighttime search warrants), cert, granted. 167 Utah Adv.
Rep. 26 (Utah 1991); Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 306-08,
313 n.12 (1958)(interpreting federal knock and announce statute);
LaFave, Search and Seizure. § 4.8(a) at 272-273; State v. Buck. 756
P.2d 700, 701 (Utah 1988).

No-knock nighttime searches have met

with judicial disfavor throughout the history of the United States.
See Jones v. United States. 357 U.S. 493, 498-500 (1958); Miller v.
United States. 357 U.S. 301 (1958).
Because of the dangers historically recognized in no-knock
nighttime searches, magistrates are to proceed with caution in
evaluating search warrant affidavits seeking no-knock nighttime
search warrants.

See State v. Rowe. 806 P.2d 730, 739-740 (Utah

App.)(Garff, J., concurring)(M[W]henever a 'canned,' or preprinted
affidavit is presented to a magistrate, he or she has an affirmative
responsibility to scrutinize the factual circumstances justifying
the search warrant.

Conclusory or ambiguous statements in the

affidavit are insufficient.

This is particularly critical when the
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warrant authorizes nighttime intrusion into a person's home.11),
cert, granted. 167 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 (Utah 1991); State v. Buck. 756
P.2d 700, 703-04 (Utah 1988)(Zimmerman, J., concurring)(explaining
the need for judicial scrutiny of no-knock searches).
Even when no-knock nighttime search warrants are issued in
compliance with pertinent statutes, the searches still must meet
constitutional standards of reasonableness.

See Ker v. California.

374 U.S. 23, 39 (1963); United State v. Mitchell. 783 F.2d 971,
973-74 (10th Cir.), cert, denied. 479 U.S. 860 (1986); Bovance v.
Myers. 398 F.2d 896, 899 (3d Cir. 1968); State v. Lindner. 592 P.2d
852, 858 (Idaho 1979), LaFave, Search and Seizure. § 4.7(b) 264-267;
State v. Rowe. 806 P.2d 730, 739 n.ll (Utah App.), cert, granted„
167 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 (Utah 1991).
Under Utah Code Ann. section 77-23-10(2), in order to issue
a no-knock warrant, the magistrate must have facts in the affidavit
or supplemental record which provide "proof, under oath, that the
object of the search may be quickly destroyed, disposed of, or
secreted, or that physical harm may result to any person if notice
were given."
Under Utah Code Ann. section 77-23-5(1), in order to issue
a nighttime warrant, the magistrate must have facts in the affidavit
or supplemental record which provide "a reasonable cause to believe
a search is necessary in the night to seize the property prior to it
being concealed, destroyed, damaged or altered, or for other good
reason[.]"

Under the current statute, it is not enough for the

issuance of the nighttime warrant to show that the evidence is
likely to be present at night; there must be a reason why the search
-18-

must occur at night, rather than during the day.

State v. Rove, 806

P.2d 730, 733 (Utah App.), cert, granted, 167 Utah Adv. Rep. 26
(Utah 1991); LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 4.7(b) 264 and n.20.

C. THE AFFIDAVIT DOES NOT PROVIDE PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE ISSUANCE
OF THE NO-KNOCK NIGHTTIME SEARCH WARRANT.
Certain fundamental problems apparent on the face of the
search warrant and affidavit indicate that, in issuing the no-knock
nighttime search warrant without further clarification, the
magistrate was acting as more of a rubber stamp than as a neutral
and detached arbiter of probable cause.
The warrant itself demonstrates a delegation of judicial
authority by the magistrate to the police.

The warrant seeks to

seize "U.S. Currency, and all items which are determined to be
collateral or proceeds from narcotics transactions.11

This portion

of the warrant transforms the warrant into a general warrant, giving
the searching officers unlimited discretion to search for and seize
property that has no apparent connection to the crimes at issue,
possession of illegal drugs, and possession with intent to
distribute.

Such general warrants are illegal.

See State v.

Gallegos, 712 P.2d 207, 209 (Utah 1985)("The fourth amendment to the
United States Constitution requires that 'no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the things . . . to be seized.'

This

portion of the amendment is essentially a proscription against
general warrants whereby administrative officers determine what is
and what is not to be seized.

The decision to seize must be
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judicial, as opposed to administrative, and the warrant must be
sufficiently particular to guide the officer to the thing intended
to be seized, thereby minimizing the danger of unwarranted invasion
of privacy.")(emphasis added).
The first noticeable problem with the affidavit is that the
affidavit refers to two apartments—#8 and #18, while the search
warrant is limited to one apartment—#8.

The facts in the affidavit

apparently relating to apartment #8 are that Officer Watson
initiated through a confidential informant a controlled buy of an
unidentified quantity of cocaine from an unidentified person or
persons inside the "residence to be searched" (Aff• J52 and 3).

The

allegation that a car matching a confidential informant's
description of the car of an alleged cocaine dealer, Rene Montoya,
was observed parked at "the address to be searched" (Aff. f5) might
arguably apply to apartment #8 since apartment # 8 is the address to
be searched.

However, there is no indication in the affidavit that

the parking is correlated to the apartment numbers.
The information in the affidavit relating specifically to
apartment #18 indicates that apartment #18 is the location of the
telephone with the number 485-6125, the telephone number subscribed
to by Rene Montoya, the telephone number provided by a confidential
informant who indicated that the person with this phone number was a
hispanic male named Rene, who was dealing in large quantities of
cocaine at approximately 2000 South (Aff. f4).
The other assertions in the affidavit, including references
to counter-surveillance and threatened use of a gun to protect
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narcotics, do not refer specifically to apartment #8 or #18 but are
alleged against Rene or Montoya, the person listed as the telephone
subscriber in apartment #18 (Aff. 515-7, 10-11).
It may be that Rene Montoya (named in the search warrant
affidavit) and Rene Ruiz (the appellant) are different people who
were living in separate apartments at the time the magistrate signed
the search warrant.

It may be that the affidavit contains a

typographical error in mentioning apartments #8 and #18. Such
possibilities may have grave consequences in the context of no-knock
nighttime searches, and the magistrate should have clarified this
facial problem with the affidavit prior to issuing the warrant.

See

Judge Garff's concurring opinion in Rowe, supra (noting magistrates'
duty to scrutinize affidavits, particularly in cases seeking
no-knock nighttime warrants).
The second facial problem with the affidavit is that it
fails to provide an adequate showing of the reliability, veracity
and basis of knowledge of the confidential informants.

In this case

involving multiple confidential informants, the paragraphs of the
affidavit relating to the reliability of the information from
confidential informants do not make clear reference to any
informant, stating,
8.

Your affiant considers the information received
from the confidential informant reliable because
(if any information is obtained from an unnamed
source) All information received from the C.I.
has proven to be true and accurate. The C.I. has
always followed instructions exactly as they were
given. Your affiant has received information
from three independent confidential sources,
where-in the information is corroborating.
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9.

Your affiant has verified the above information
from the confidential informant to be correct and
accurate through the following independent
investigation; Sheriff's Office records checks
have verified information received from all
C.I.'s. All substances purchased by the C.I.
tested positive for cocaine.

(R. 55-56).

See State v. Bailey, supra (requiring a showing of

confidential informants' veracity, reliability and basis of
knowledge).
The third facial problem with the affidavit is that it is
too vague to allow independent neutral and detached assessment by a
magistrate.

Aside from the information relating to the controlled

buy which occurred during the seven days prior to the typing of the
affidavit, and Officer Watson's receipt of information from the
confidential informant with Rene Montoya's phone number sometime
"prior to" the controlled buy, none of the allegations are tied to
any timeframe.

See e.g. People v. Stoppel, 637 P.2d 384, 391 (Colo.

1981)("The grounds in an affidavit for a search warrant must have a
relationship to the date and the time that the warrant is issued.";
stale information does not provide probable cause).

Because

critical portions of the affidavit are drafted in passive voice, the
affidavit does not reflect whether the confidential informants
discussed in paragraphs 4 through 6 had personal knowledge of the
information they relayed, or whether the confidential informants
mentioned in paragraphs 4 through 6 and 11 spoke directly to the
police or were quoted to the police by other sources.

See Go-Bart

Importing Co. v. United States. 282 U.S. 344 (1931)(warrants are not
to issue on the basis of "loose, vague or doubtful bases of fact.").
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The affidavit fails to demonstrate the statutory
prerequisite to the issuance of a no-knock warrant, that "the object
of the search may be quickly destroyed, disposed of, or secreted, or
that physical harm may result to any person if notice were given."
Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-10(2).

In the instant case, the affidavit

gives no specification as to the amount of drugs expected in
apartment #8 and does not indicate the amount involved in the
controlled buy.

However, the information from the confidential

informant with the phone number for apartment #18 indicates that
"Rene" was dealing in "large quantities of drugs."

The affidavit

and warrant seek additional items that are not readily destroyed:
paraphernalia, records, and currency and "proceeds".

Because the

affidavit did not allege facts establishing probable cause to
believe that the no-knock warrant was necessary to prevent the
destruction of evidence, the magistrate should not have signed the
warrant.

See Rowe at 733-734 n.3 ("A more particularized showing

may well be required if, for example, a large quantity of drugs is
sought.

In such cases, as where the affiant has information of the

on-going cultivation or manufacture of drugs, the exigency of ready
destructability, inherent with small quantities of drugs, may not be
present.").
The no-knock warrant was not justified by the assertion
that "Montoya has made statements to two C.I.'s which indicate he
has, and will, use a hand-gun to defend his narcotics," for three
reasons.

First, there is no indication that Montoya, the phone

subscriber in apartment #18, lived in apartment #8, the place to be
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searched, according to the warrant.

Second, the veracity and

reliability of the confidential informants is unclear from the
affidavit, and it is not clear that these informants gave this
information to the police or were quoted to the police by other
informants.

Third/ the allegations concerning the gun are not tied

to any timeframe.
The affidavit fails to demonstrate the statutory
prerequisite to the issuance of a nighttime warrant, that Ma search
is necessary in the night to seize the property prior to it being
concealed, destroyed, damaged or altered, or for other good
reason[.]fl

Utah Code Ann. §77-23-5(1).

See also LaFave, Search and

Seizure, § 4.7(b) 264 and n.20 (explaining that under Utah's current
type of statute, affidavit must provide an adequate reason as to why
the search must occur at night); State v. Rowe. 806 P.2d 730, 733
(Utah App.)(same), cert, granted. 167 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 (Utah
1991).

There is nothing in the affidavit explaining why apartment

#8 had to be searched at night, rather than in the day.

As

previously discussed, the evidence to be seized was not evanescent,
and there is nothing to indicate that its seizure was more necessary
at night than in the day.

Inasmuch as all drug activity and

presumably all of the "intense counter-surveillance" occurred at
night (Aff. 110), issuance of a nighttime search warrant posed
uniquely high dangers in this case and was improper.

See State v.

Rowe, 806 P.2d 730, 734 n.4 (Utah App. 1991)("For example, if the
supporting affidavit made a particularized showing that drugs were
likely to be sold or consumed over the course of the night and
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evidence thereby lost, or that the supply was likely to be
imminently moved en masse to a different location during the night,
or that a safer search was likely at night because the house was
abustle with activity during the day and no one but the occupant was
likely to be home at night, then the propriety of a nighttime search
becomes manifest•

We caution that a mere incantation of such

circumstances will not justify a nighttime search—the required
factual showing is not one which is conducive, for example, to
preprinted language.")(emphasis added), cert, granted, 167 Utah Adv.
Rep. 26 (Utah 1991).

See generally Rowe; State v. Droneburg, 781

P.2d 1303 (Utah App. 1989).
The federal "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule
has not been and should not be adopted under the exclusionary rule
of Article I section 14 of the Utah Constitution.
737-738 and appendix to Rowe opinion at 740-743.

See Rowe at
Even if the "good

faith" exception could be applied in this state, it does not apply
in this case because no officer could rely in good faith on the
barebones affidavit submitted in this case.

See Rowe at 738 (good

faith exception does not apply when magistrate acts as a rubber
stamp).
The violations in this case are substantive and require
suppression.

The affidavit and warrant are too vague to support a

finding of probable cause to search particularly in a no-knock
nighttime manner, and constitute violations of the fourth amendment
of the United States Constitution and Article I section 14 of the
Utah Constitution.

The affidavit fails to establish statutory
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grounds for a no-knock nighttime warrant.

Suppression is the

appropriate remedy for the substantive rights violations involved
here.

Rowe at 738.

See State v. LaRocco. 794 P.2d 460, 465-73

(Utah 1990)(plurality)(adopting exclusionary rule under Article I
section 14 of the Utah Constitution, and reserving judgment on
whether or not the court will adopt exceptions to the Utah
exclusionary rule).

CONCLUSION
This Court should reverse the trial court's denial of
Mr. Ruiz's motion to suppress and remand this case to the trial
court for further proceedings.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

day of June, 1992.

LISA J. REMAL
Attorney for Mr. Ruiz
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APPENDIX 1

TEXT OF CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS

Amendment IV to the Constitution of the United States provides:
The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized.
Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah provides:
Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbiddenIssuance of warrant.]
The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation,
particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the person or thing to be seized.
Utah Code Ann. section 77-1-3 (1991 Cum. Supp.) provides in
pertinent part:
77-1-3• Definitions.
For the purpose of this act:
. . .

(4) ,fMagistrate" means a justice of
the Supreme Court, a judge of the district
courts, a judge of the juvenile courts, a
judge of the circuit courts and a justice of
the peace or a judge of any court created by
law.

Utah Code Ann. section 77-23-4 (1990 Repl. Vol.) provides in
pertinent part:
77-23-4. Examination of complainant and
witnesses—Witness not in physical presence of
magistrate—Duplicate original warrants—Return.
(1) All evidence to be considered by a
magistrate in the issuance of a search
warrant shall be given on oath and either
reduced to writing or recorded verbatim.
Transcription of the recorded testimony need
not precede the issuance of the warrant.
Any person having standing to contest the
search may request and shall be provided
with a transcription of the recorded
testimony in support of the application for
the warrant.

Utah Code Ann. section 77-23-5 (1990 Repl. Vol.) provides in
pertinent part:
77-23-5. Time for service—Officer may request
assistance.
(1) The magistrate must insert a
direction in the warrant that it be served
in the daytime, unless the affidavits or
oral testimony state a reasonable cause to
believe a search is necessary in the night
to seize the property prior to it being
concealed, destroyed, damaged or altered, or
for other good reason; in which case he may
insert a direction that it be served any
time of the day or night. An officer may
request other persons to assist him in
conducting the search.

Utah Code Ann, section 77-23-10 (1990 Repl. Vol.) provides in
pertinent part:
77-23-10. Force used in executing warrant-Notice of authority prerequisite, when.
When a search warrant has been issued
authorizing entry into any building, room,
conveyance, compartment or other enclosure, the
officer executing the warrant may use such force
as is reasonably necessary to enter:
•

• •

(2) Without notice of his authority
and purpose, if the magistrate issuing the
warrant directs in the warrant that the
officer need not give notice. The
magistrate shall so direct only upon proof,
under oath, that the object of the search
may be quickly destroyed, disposed of, or
secreted, or that physical harm may result
to any person if notice were given.
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IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

°epU,y

IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH
SEARCH WARRANT
No.
COJNTV

OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH

Tz ar.y Deacr officer in the State of Utah.
Frcof oy Affidavit under oath having been made this Jay before me V
Detective C. Watson-SLCOSO
• * I am satisfied
tnat
therr .i
pror^aoie cars? to oeiieve
: :

f *ut

OCX) on the persoru's) of Rene MONTOYA, a male Hispanic, age:
approximately 30 years, height: 5 f 2 u , weight: 145 pounds.
( ) in the ver;icle(s) described as
•XX) oa the premises known as 1975 South 1100 East, #8, the
upper south-east unit of an apartment building.

I i tne City of Salt Lake
• County of Salt Lake. State o r
iJtar., tnere is now certain prooerty or evidence described as:
Cocaine, a white substance in powder or solid form.
Drug paraphernalia, specifically smoking devices, scales, cutting agent
and packaging materials. Records pertaining to narcotics transactions.
U . S . Currency, and all items which are determined to be collateral or
proceeds from narcotics transactions.
an.j that said property or evidence:
OCX) was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed, or
OCX) nas been used to commit or conceal a public offense, or
6(X) is being possessed with the ourpose to use it as a mei.i*
of committing or concealing a public offense, or
OCX) consists of an item or constitutes evidence of iilesa"
conduct, possessed by a party to the illegal conduct, or
( ) consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal
conduct, possessed by a person or entity not a oarty to
the illegal conduct,
[Note requirements of Utah Code
Annotated*, 77-23-312 J ]

00059

P\GE 2
SEARCH WARRANT
You i r e

tiierefore

com:nanded

C ) in the day time
at any time d a y or n i g h t (good c a u s e h a v i n g been shown''
to e x e c u t e w i t h o u t n o t i c e of a u t h o r i t y or p u r p o s e , (proof
under oatn being s h o w n that the o b j e c t of this search inv
be quickly d e s t r o y e d
or disposed
of or that harm !:•'
result to any p e r s o n if n o t i c e w e r e g i v e n )
to
make
a
search
of the
ve.'iiclef s ) , and p r e m i s e s for
e v i d e n c e and if you find tur
fort.i-wit.-i before me at the ri
State- of U t a h , or retain sue
t;ie o r d e r of tnis court.

otVfc.N UMJEK

HANI) and d a t e d

above-named
or
described
p e r s o n ' s J.
the h e r e i n - a b o v e d e s c r i b e d p r o p e r t y or
same or any p a r t t h e r e o f , to briru i i
"ti; C i r c u i t C o u r t , County of Salt La
\ p r o p e r t y in y o u r c u s t o d y
surie::

tnis

COJI:

000=53

IX THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT. SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
!.»' AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATc Or UTAH

)

County of Salt Lake

)

J> 3
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AFFIDV/T
\FFlpW:
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430 Soutn 2nd East
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.7...- undersigned

=}R SEARCH
SEARCH WARRANT
WARRANT
=}R

affiant

A n ris t e c
ADDRESS

being first duly sworn, deposes and Sa/ 3 :

.iv has reason to believe
'.XX oi tne psrsonCs) of
Rene MONTOYA, a male Hispanic, age
approximately 30 years, height: 5'2" f weight: 145 pounds.
as
% ) i«i t:ie vehicle(s) described

(XX o-\ the premises knowi as 1975 South 1100 East, #8,
the upper south-east unit of an apartment building.
County of Salt Lak?, State
evidence
described as
:
i
*
e
is
now
certain
property or
th
Cocaine, a white substance in powder or solid form.
Drug paraphernalia, specifically smoking devices, scales, cutting agen
and packaging materials. Records pertaining to narcotics transactions
U.S. Currency, and all items which are determined to be collateral or

:itv of Salt Lake

(XX was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed, or
(X* has been used to commit or conceal a public offense, o
(X* is being possessed with the purpose to use it as a m e a n of committing or concealing a public offense, or
(X* consists of an item or constitutes evidence of ill e e a l
conduct, possessed by a party to the illegal conduct, or
( ) consists of an item or constitutes evidence of ill e*a I
conduct, possessed by a person or entity not a p*rt
the illegal
conduct.
[Note requirements of Utah Code
Annotated, 77-23-5(2}]
Affiant
believes
the
property
and
evidence
described
above
is
evidence of *he crime(s) of Possession of a controlled snh^anrft. and/Possession of a controlled substance with the intent to d i ^ - ^ - ^

ArriDnVIl FOR SEARCH WARRANT
Th" zicis
re :

to establish

tiie grounds

for issuance of a Search Warrant

J

Your affiant is a Deputy Sheriff for the Salt Lake County Sheriff's
Office with over two years experience. Your affiant has been assigned
to the Narcotics Division for one year, and has worked as an Undercover •
Investigator for eight months. During which time, your affiant made
over 170 undercover drug buys. Your affiant has been trained by the
Utah Peace Officer's Standards and Training, the Salt Lake County
Sheriff's Training Division, and numerous hours of on the job training.
Your affiant has also received 24 hours training from the Clandestine I'
Investigators Association, {C.L.I.A.), and 24 hours from the California l
Narcotics Officers Association, (C.N.O.A.).
Your affiant, in the past seven days, has initiated the purchase of
controlled substance from inside the address to be searched, specifica^
cocaine. This was done by utilizing a confidential informant,
(hereafter referred to as a C . I . ) . The circumstances surrounding the
purchase are described as follows:
The C.I. was searched prior to, and immediately after the purchase.
This was done to ensure no other controlled substance, or money, were
present. The C.I. was given a pre-determined amount of money. The
C.I. was kept under constant visual observation from the time of the
first search, until the second, with the exception of the time the C.I.
was directly inside the residence to be searched. At the time of the
second search, the C.I. produced a substance, which field tested
positive for cocaine.
Prior to the above described purchase, your affiant received informatior
from a second C.I., that a Hispanic, Male, named RENE, was dealing in
large quantities of cocaine, and he lived in an apartment located at
approximately 2000 South. This C.I. did have the phone number for RENE,
and gave it to the Sheriff's Office. The number is 485-6125. This
number was checked with telephone security, and the subscriber was
listed as Rene MONTOYA, at 1975 South 1100 East, #18.
Your affiant has also been advised by Detective Keith Stephens, of the
Sheriff f s Office Narcotics Division, of a third C.I. he had received
information from, about a Hispanic, Male, named: RENE, who was dealing
cocaine at 1975 South 1100 East. This C.I. gave a description of a
vehicle, which Rene MONTOYA had been driving. A vehicle matching the
description has been observed parked at the address to be searched by
your affiant.
This C.I. also advised Detective Stephens of the intense counter
surveillance done by MONTOYA, and those who help, and/or work for
him. This counter surveillance has been observed by your affiant.
^Y©u.A
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PAGE 5
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT
Your dffiant considers tJie information received from the confidential
informant reliaole because (if any information is obtained from an
unaamed source) All information received from the C.I. has proven to 1
true and accurate. The C.I. has always followed instructions exactly
as they were given. Your affiant has received information from three
independent confidential sources, where-in the information is
corroborating.
Your affiant nas verified t.ie above information from the confidential
informant
to
be
correct
and
accurate
through
the
following
independent investigation: Sheriff's Office records checks have verifi
information received from all C.I.'s. All substances purchased by the
C.I. tested positive for cocaine.
I; ii£K£F0r'iI, t:ie affiant prays
seicjre of s^:d iteuis:
)

i'i t h e d<

tiat a Search Warrant be issued for t.v*

time

#X) a- a n ^ time day or night because there is reason t~
ueiieve it is necessary to seize the property prior to it
being concealed, destroyed, damaged, or altered, or for
other gooi reasons, to-wit:
All narcotics related activity at the address to be
searched was observed in the evening hours.
T: is further requested that (if appropriate) tne officer executing
t*,<> requested warrant not be required to give notice of the officer's
authority or purpose because:
#X) paysical h a m may result to any person if notice werz
given; or
fi§ t.ie property sought may be quickly destroyed, dispose:
of* or secreted.
T^is danger is believed to exist because:
Hand-guns have been found on most narcotic search warrants.
Montoya has made statements to two C.I.'s, which indicate he has, and
will, use a hand-gun to defend his narcotics.
Counter surveillance has been observed at 1975 South 1100 East.

AFFIANT
SUBSCRIBED

fv

AND

SKORS TO

BEFORE

ME

this

^ M JA
_[^^^^oi

JDGE fef'MHB TOa*/CIRCUIT COURT,
'JUDGE
INi AND I^lSAXJjSfiAJPE COUNTY, STATE
OF•• UTAH ^kiLg&r
i

RETURN TO SEARCH WARRANT
NO.
The personal property
attached
as

hereto) was

taken

(XXXXXXXX^OTset

from

the premises

out on the inventory
located

and

day of

June

described

1975 South 1100 East, #8

and from the vehicle(s) described as

and from the person(s) of

by virtue

of a search

n/a

n/a

warrant

dated

the 5th

1924*
and executed by Judge

Michael L. Hutchings

of the above-entitled court:

Third Circuit Court

I,
do

swear

detailed

era j g Watson
that

account

the

t by whom

(£&#X#/att ached)

this warrant

inventory

contains

was
a

executed,
true

and

of all the property taken by me under the warrant,

on the 5th day of Juney 1990.

00057

The following will be a list of items seized pursuant to a search
warrant at 1975 South 1100 East, #8, on the date of June 5th, 1990.

Narcotics:

Page A:

#1:

Seven small bags of cocaine, (each containing onesixteenth of an ounce), and one small bag of heroin,
(containing one gram).

#2:

A small amount of cocaine.

Paraphernalia: Page B:
#1:

One red scale,

#2:

One syringe, and cooker.

#3:

One box of baggies.

Guns/Knives:

Page C:

#1:

One Rino, .22 calibre, pearl handle,
number: 32724.

#2:

One Hialeah, .38 calibre, pearl handle,
Derringer, number: 04156.

#3:

One Sterling, .22 calibre, black handle,
number: E12519.

#4:

One Luger, .22 calibre, brown handle,
number: CL07675.

#5:

A silver handle knife.

Money:

Page D:

#1:

Eight hundred and forty two dollars,
($842.00), in U.S. Currency.

#2:

One thousand one hundred t h i r t y seven d o l l a r s ,
($1137.00), in U.S. Currency.

non^p

All
retained

of

tne property

taken by virtue of said warrant will be

in niy custody subject

to the order of this court of or any

other court in which the offense in respect

to which the property or

things taken, is triable.

*

/

•
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